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INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
WAYNE MCCORMACKt

Close at the heart of our federal system is a problem that has
plagued both federal and state governments since the beginning of this
form of government. The problem is the degree of immunity that one
government may enjoy from the taxes and regulations of the other. The
Constitution does not deal explicitly with the problem of intergovernmental immunity, and the first debates over the Constitution centered
on the separate but related question of the permissible scope of federal
power under the "necessary and proper" clause. The immunity problem
arose early, however, following the assertion by the federal government
of the prerogative to adopt whatever measures were appropriate to
accomplish purposes deemed to be within the substantive reach of its
powers.2 The states reacted by adopting counter-measures against what
they viewed as incursions into their domains, 3 but the federal government successfully asserted immunity from state control.4
The immunity of the federal government from state control and
regulation has often been thought to occasion reciprocal immunity for
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
'See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 197 (C. Beard ed. 1959) (J. Madison). Madison, one
of the defenders of the Constitution, argued that the "necessary and proper" clause was an inherent
attribute of government: "Had the Constitution been silent on this head there can be no doubt that
all the particular powers, requisite as means of executing the general powers, would have resulted
to the government, by unavoidable implication."
2The debate over federal powers erupted early in Washington's first term as President when
it was proposed by Hamilton that a national bank be created with a system of branches for the
purpose of providing ready capital, supporting federal programs, and helping collect taxes. When
the incorporation bill was passed by Congress, Washington asked for opinions on its constitutionality from his cabinet members. The two principal responses were from Jefferson, Secretary of
State, and Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury.
Jefferson urged that the incorporation of a bank was beyond the specific powers of the federal
government and that the "necessary and proper" clause should be limited to "the necessary means,
that is to say, to those means without which the grant of power would be nugatory." 3 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 149-50 (Monticello ed. 1904).
Hamilton vigorously defended the constitutionality of the bank on the ground that it would
facilitate tax collection and help in interstate trade. The "necessary and proper" clause was interpreted as including programs "needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive" to the express

powers, so long as the means were not specifically prohibited. 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 102 (H. Syrett ed. 1965).
3See Virginia Resolutions, in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 54 (H. Ames ed.
1900).
4
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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the states from federal control and regulation. 5 In this century, however,

it has become increasingly clear that essential federal programs might
affect directly some state governmental functions. Despite the supremacy clause,' which would seem to belie any state immunity from other-

wise valid federal programs, the argument for immunity still is made
on behalf of the states.7

The problem takes on extreme complexity when the federal government creates a claim on behalf of private persons against the state
government. Private remedies that are designed to vindicate these
claims have been challenged by states under the eleventh amendment,'
which has been interpreted as providing a form of state sovereign immunity from suit.' If the eleventh amendment continues to be read in
this fashion, some surprising and anomalous limitations on the exercise
of federal statutory rights are possible. For example, federal rights that
are enforcable against state governments by the federal government,

might nevertheless be unenforceable by private lawsuit on behalf of the
person for whom the right was created.10 In light of recent federal legissCompare Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842), with
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1871). "[lf the means and instrumentalities employed
by [the federal] government to carry into operation the powers granted to it are, necessarily, and,
for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the
States depending upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal taxation?" Id. at 127.
'U.S. CoNsT. art. VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
'See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 199 (1968); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
405 U.S. 1016 (1972) (No. 71-1021).
'See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (private suit under FELA); Briggs v.
Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
'Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890); see Guthrie,
The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the UnitedStates, 8 CoLuNI. L. REv.
183 (1908); Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its Recent
Developments, 40 MINN. L. Rev. 234, 236 (1956).
"Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 200 (1968), held that the wage and hour provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act might be applied validly to state schools and hospitals but refused to
specify what remedies are available for enforcement.
Percolating through each of these provisions for relief are interests of the United States
and problems of immunity, agency, and consent to suit . . . . The constitutionality of
applying the substantive requirements of the Act to the States is not, in our view,
affected by the possibility that one or more of the remedies the Act provides might not
be available when a State is the employer-defendant. . . . Questions of state immunity
[from suit] are therefore reserved for appropriate future cases.
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lation which has created new rights of individuals against the states,"
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities and the eleventh amend-

ment should be reconsidered as they apply to these new rights.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

The history of intergovernmental immunities in this country is
largely a history of the taxation power. Taxation was until this century

the primary means of governmental regulation, 12 as well as the source
of revenue.1 3 The potential of the taxation power to generate friction

between the state and federal governments is reflected in Justice MarThe question about available remedies was answered in favor of the federal government when
enforcement was sought by the Secretary of Labor. Hodgson v. Board of Educ., 344 F. Supp. 79
(D.N.J. 1972). However, there is a split in the circuits whether suit can be maintained when
enforcement has been sought by private employees. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972) (No. 71-1021); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829
(1970); see note 165 and accompanying text infra.
"See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
"2Through the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court reviewed
many taxes that clearly had regulatory purposes but held consistently that the taxation power was
plenary and that the judiciary could not inquire into the motives of Congress to determine whether
a tax was a true revenue-raising measure or a prohibitory enactment. Taxes held valid under this
reasoning included prohibitive taxes on narcotics, United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919);
yellow oleomargarine, McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); and state bank notes, Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
The Court seemed to make an abrupt switch in philosophy when it declared invalid the tax
on net profits of businesses employing child labor. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20,
38 (1922):
Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects
with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive
of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their
character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there comes a time in the
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as
such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.
More decisions following Drexel Furniture overturned taxes on liquor sales, United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), and on commodities futures, Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
The line of reasoning turned back to judicial restraint with the validation of taxes on gambling,
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); marijuana sales, United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S.
42 (1950); and firearms, Senzinky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) ("as it is not attended
by an offensive regulation and since it operates as a tax, it is within the national taxing power").
Kahrigerwas eventually overruled on the basis of fifth amendment objections to the reporting and
registration requirements. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); see Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
3
The
r
taxation power is almost unlimited when it is used expressly for revenue raising purposes. See note 70 infra.
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shall's famous phrase, "IT]he power of taxing ... may be exercised so

as to destroy .... These factors require a treatment of taxation
immunities before turning to consideration of modern regulatory provisions that raise the question of intergovernmental immunity in a new
context.
Taxation Immunity
5 arose out of an
The landmark case of M'Culloch v. Maryland"
attempt by the State of Maryland to impose a tax on the issuing of bank
notes by the Bank of the United States," which was operating a branch
in Maryland. The Supreme Court, through Justice Marshall, held that
creation of the bank was within the powers of the federal government
and that the bank was immune from the state taxation. The discussion
of the bank's immunity was set out in one of Marshall's famous threepoint syllogisms; 7 at the heart of his opinion was an assertion of the
supremacy of the federal government as the representative of all the
people. From this principle he inferred the nonreciprocal nature of
intergovernmental immunity: the federal government could tax the activities of state governments because it would be taxing its own constituents, whereas a state would be able to restrict the activities of a government with broader constituencies if it were allowed to tax the instrumentalities of the federal government."8
Notwithstanding Marshall's conception of federal power, the principle of reciprocal immunity from taxation prevailed in the late nineteenth century in the decison in Collector v. Day.'" The Supreme Court
held that the federal government could not tax the income of a state
judge.2 1 Justice Bradley, in a strong dissent, echoed the political con"M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
"The case arose as a state criminal prosecution against M'Culloch, the chief executive officer
of the Baltimore branch for refusing to pay the tax. See generally R. CATrERALL, THE SECOND
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES (1903); B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA-FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957).
t1"lst. [T]hat a power to create implies a power to preserve. 2nd. That a power to destroy, if
wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and to
preserve. 3rd. That where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control,
not yield to that over which it is supreme." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
"Id. at 428-29.
"178 U.S. (I I Wall.) 113 (1871).
2The Court had previously held that a state could not tax the salary of a federal official.
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842). Dobbins was implicitly
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cepts of Marshall by referring to the interests of other states and of the
people in the activities of the federal government. 21 Bradley urged a
nonreciprocal immunity that would leave the federal government free
to tax most state activities while it remained immune from state taxation.
Later decisions expanded reciprocal immunity to protect private
taxpayers whose relationship with a government demonstrated that any
tax liability imposed on them would ultimately fall on a state or the
federal government. The relationships that carried immunity included
the leasing of public lands, 22 selling to governments," and, temporarily,
even the holding of a patent.2 4 Although the scope of immunity had been
broadened to include private persons dealing with governments, it was
limited by a distinction between governmental and proprietary activities.2 Under this distinction, the federal government could tax any stateconducted activities that had been traditionally conducted by private
26
business.
About the same time that New Deal legislation was beginning to
win approval in the Supreme Court,2 the wholesale granting of constituoverruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), upon the realization that
M'Culloch did not require immunity for the employee or special treatment for the government.
See notes
32-38 and accompanying text infra.
21
[[T]he general government has the same power of taxing the income of the officers
of the State governments as it has of taxing that of its own officers. . . . The taxation
by the State governments of the instruments employed by the general government in the
exercise of its powers, is a very different thing. Such taxation involves an interference
with the powers of a government in which other States and their citizens are equally
interested with the State which imposes the taxation.
78 U.S. (I I Wall.) at 128-29.
2Compare Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (lessee of state lands
immune from federal income tax) with Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (lessee of
Indian lands immune from state income tax).
2'Compare Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (sales to federal government immune from state sales tax) with Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570
(1931) (sales to state immune from federal tax).
2
1Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928), overruled by Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123 (1932).
2'See, e.g., Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (operation by Massachusetts of Boston
street railway); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (operation of state liquor
store).
2
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368 (1934), reaffirmed that "the immunity of the states
from federal taxation is limited to those agencies which are of a governmental character. Whenever
a state engages in a business of a private nature it exercises nongovernmental functions, and the
business, though conducted by the state, is not immune from the exercise of the power of taxation
which the Constitution vests in the Congress." The governmental-proprietary distinction was never
applied for the purpose of taxing federal activities. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text infra.
"See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
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tional tax immunity began to end. 8 The significant turnaround came
with Mr. Justice Stone's opinion in Helvering v. Gerhardt,29 which held
that federal income tax could be levied on the salaries of employees of
the New York Port Authority, which was a joint operation of the states
of New York and New Jersey. Justice Stone asserted three separate
bases for the denial of immunity to state employees. First was the
Marshallian doctrine of greater taxing power in the federal government." Secondly, Stone relied on the proposition that the Port Authority was not performing an essential governmental function. 1 A third
proposition seemed to call into question much of the prior doctrine of
immunity and its economic justification with respect to private persons
having some relationship with a government. Stone maintained that
immunity for salaries was not essential to governmental integrity and
that it should not be used "to confer on the state a competitive advantage over private persons" engaged in the same conduct," in this case
the hiring of employees.
Gerhardt did not result in complete rejection of the ideal of reciprocity, for the Court later followed Justice Stone's economic rationales
to deny immunity to federal employees from state income taxes.33
Having limited state immunity, the Court limited federal immunity in
symmetrical fashion. Governmental or proprietary distinctions were not
deemed controlling; instead the nature of the transaction being taxed
was said to be determinative. 34 The receipt of compensation for contracted services could be taxed because the burden on state and federal
governments was indirect and slight. No government had need of a
"competitive advantage" over private employers or contractors when
the transaction was one not distinctly governmental, but in transactions
characteristically governmental, such as the issuing of bank notes for
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See generally R.

JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL

(1941).
"See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (proceeds of construction contract
with United States subject to state gross receipts tax); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376 (1938) (lessees of public lands subject to income taxes); cf. notes 21-22 supra.
-304 U.S. 405 (1938).
11Id. at 416.
31
1d. at 421.
1Id. The conduct to which reference was made was apparently the acts of employing person.
nel and paying salaries.
"Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
"See id. at 483-85.
SUPREMACY
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national economic stabilization, the immunity was preserved.3 5 Even
when the burden was directly on the state rather than on persons with
some relationship to the state, the Court ceased inquiring into the governmental or proprietary character of the agency being taxed and in-

quired into the nature of the particular transaction involved. For example, revenues collected by state schools from the sale of tickets to foot-

ball games could be taxed. 6 This inquiry into the nature of the transaction rather than the nature of the institution comported with the idea

of taxing salaries or sales as if those activities were carried on for private
employers or buyers.3 The opinions reflected dissatisfaction with the
governmental-proprietary distinction, which could not comfortably be

reconciled with the reciprocity ideal, for it did not admit of symmetrical
application.3 The Court adhered to the notion that the federal govern-

ment was one of such limited powers that its activities if legitimate,
39
could only be deemed governmental and not proprietary.

Thus by the mid-1940's, reciprocal immunity had become an ideal
of questionable validity, because all immunity was limited to govern-

mental transactions 0 and the limitation was not precisely symmetrical.
In federal operations it gave broad immunity to any government-created
entity, whereas in state operations it was based on the governmental

character of the particular transaction involved rather than the nature
of the institution making the transaction. In New York v. United
The continued vitality of M'Culloch has been seriously challenged on the ground that the
modern banking system is in no significant way a function of government. The Supreme Court
refused to overrule M'Culloch, with heavy reliance on statutory rather than constitutional provisions. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
36Allen v. Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938). It was conceded that the
proceeds of football games were used for educational purposes, a governmental function. For an
interesting analysis of the Allen case see Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REv. 663, 649 (1945).
3T
See generally Brown, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 153 (1940);
Graham & Stinson, Two Centuries of Tax Immunity, 18 N.C.L. REV. 16 (1939); Snedeker,
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, 15 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 8 (1942).
31See Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1886): "The United States do not and
cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes."
"3See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 467 (1939) (emphasis added):
As that government [federal] derives its authority wholly from powers delegated to it
by the Constitution, its every action within its constitutionalpower is governmental
action, and since Congress is made the sole judge of what powers within the constitutional grant are to be exercised, all activities of government constitutionally authorized
by Congress must stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional immunity from
taxation.
"0See Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1945).
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States"t the Supreme Court had a case clearly governed by established

principles. The State of New York was operating a mineral water bottling plant and selling the waters of its natural springs, and the federal
government sought to tax it as it would have taxed any other mineral
water bottling plant. 2 Justice Frankfurter, announcing the judgment of

the Court, took the opportunity to advocate rejection of the concept of
reciprocity and to promulgate a new test of tax immunity, stating that
a tax on a state entity should be valid if it is nondiscriminatory, falling
equally on any state and on any private persons who came within the
same subject matter of taxation.43 Frankfurter expressly rejected any
distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities but
maintained that the state could not be taxed on those activities that were

"uniquely" characteristic only of a government.44
Frankfurter's mental gymnastics proved too much for the rest of
the majority,45 who, in an opinion by Justice Stone, also found the
"governmental-proprietary" distinction untenable but believed that
there might be nondiscriminatory taxes that "would nevertheless impair
4'326 U.S. 572 (1946).
"2lnternal Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 615(a)(5), 47 Stat. 265.
"Justice Frankfurter also added some remarks about the claim of intergovernmental immunity, implying that the whole subject should be treated as a "political question."
[Recent cases] indicate an awareness of the limited role of courts in assessing the relative
weight of the factors upon which immunity is based. Any implied limitation upon the
supremacy of the federal power to levy a tax like that now before us, in the absence of
discrimination against State activities, brings fiscal and political factors into play. The
problem cannot escape issues that do not lend themselves to judgment by criteria and
methods of reasoning that are within the professional training and special competence
of judges.
326 U.S. at 583-84. It is surprising to find an eminent jurist urging an abdication of the judicial
function when confronted with a controversy between two parties over this question of law. The
judicial function could be used to decide that Congress had absolute unfettered discretion to impose
taxes, but that would be a decision against immunity. The judicial philosophy of Frankfurter that
called for non-decision over many questions of constitutional law is reflected in cases such as
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 (1951) (concurring opinion) (Communist Party prosecution: "it is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interests which this case presents
were the primary responsibility for reconciling it ours"); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 55354 (1946) (reapportionment: "it is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the
politics of the people"); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
These views conflict sharply with those of Justice Marshall and others. It was Marshall who
early espoused a doctrine of judicial responsibility or accountability: "We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120, 181 (1821).
"See note 72 infra.
"Only Justice Rutledge joined the opinion of Justice Frankfurter. Rutledge, however, also
filed a separate concurring opinion. 326 U.S. at 584.
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the sovereign status of the State."4 Justice Stone reverted to the language of reciprocal immunity that he had earlier rejected and pointed
to M'Culloch as an impairment of sovereign status by nondiscrimi47
natory taxation.
The taxation cases thus lead to the conclusion that the federal
government's activities cannot be taxed, although persons dealing with
the federal government may be taxed on the basis of the transactions
they carry out. Conversely, state governments, as well as persons dealing with them, may be taxed according to the nature of the particular
transaction. Not since New York v. United States has any significant
litigation in this area found its way to the Supreme Court. Apparently,
no state has felt its sovereign status sufficiently impaired by federal
taxation to warrant raising the Stone distinction. A hesitant conclusion
might be offered that perfect reciprocity is no longer a hotly pursued
ideal and that any challenge to federal taxation of a state activity would
require a showing of actual impairment of state functions.
Regulatory Immunity
The taxation cases have resulted in highly unsatisfactory logical
distinctions, although they are probably in accord with popular conceptions of federalism. Most persons probably have a feeling that it would
be wrong for the federal government to impose a tax on the attributes
of state sovereignty that are uniquely governmental. For example, a
federal tax based on the number of policemen or firemen hired by a state
would certainly raise an outcry and would likely be declared unconstitutional if it were not part of a general program of taxation that affected
all employers equally. Perhaps the major reason for this feeling about
the taxing power is that it has been historically a major source of regulatory power for the federal government.48 Before the New Deal brought
49
widespread regulatory programs enacted under the commerce power,
taxation of an often prohibitory degree was enacted to regulate probOld.

at 586-87.
"Some of the problems inherent in this position are reflected in the fact that the Maryland
tax invalidated in M'Culloch was a discriminatory tax that applied only to banks chartered by the
federal government. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 320.
"The federal statutes still contain many prohibitory and regulatory taxes. See INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 5001-862.
"1For a discussion of the problems confronted by reformers in the early part of this century,
see Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (pta.
I-IV), 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381, 400, 452 (1919).
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lems relating to child labor, 5° foods, 5 and drugs. 51 More sophisticated
uses of the commerce power 53 and more open and direct regulatory
programs have followed the New Deal legislation. The states, unhampered by limited power, have also developed extensive regulatory
schemes, often in advance of the federal government. The development
of concepts of immunity from regulatory programs has paralleled the
development of taxation immunities.
Federal immunity from state regulatory programs has been invoked to protect federal employees from penalty under state regulations
licensing drivers 4 and to relieve federal contractors 55 from state licensing requirements even in situations in which they would be subject to
state taxation. 56 The reasons given for regulatory immunity reflect the
fear of the Court in M'Culloch v. Maryland that a single state might
impede the activities of the federal government. Federal immunity from
state regulatory provisions is broader than the immunity from taxation,
apparently because regulation is a more direct form of control than
taxation.Y For example, regulation of prices by the states was held
inapplicable to federal purchasing which operated on a policy of competitive bidding."
When federal regulatory programs began to affect state activities,
the states argued for reciprocal immunity of the type that had been in
effect for taxation. The Supreme Court was quick to point out a significant difference between the taxing power and the regulatory power
under the specific powers granted to the federal government by the
"0Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), invalidated a tax on businesses selling
products made with child labor after an earlier attempt to exclude the same items from interstate

commerce had been invalidated in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See note 12 supra,
5
See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
52
See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
5See. e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5
'Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920). Johnson was fined for driving a mail truck in the
course of employment by the United States without a valid state driver's license.
"Leslie Miller Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956) (per curiam).
"James v. Dravo Contracting Corp., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
t
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920) (driver's license): "Such a requirement does
not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of
them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that
the Government has pronounced sufficient."
" Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963). See also Public Util. Comm'n v. United States,
355 U.S. 534 (1958), in which the Court invalidated California statutory and regulatory provisions
that purported to regulate rates charged the federal government by common carriers.
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Constitution. In applying the Federal Safety Appliances Act 59 to a state0 the Court
owned and -operated railroad within interstate commerce,1
held that taxation immunity principles were wholly inapplicable and
that it was irrelevant whether the state was operating in its "sovereign"
or "private" capacity. The Court said that the commerce power is a
delegation of sovereignty to the federal government over anything that
comes within the scope of that grant of power and that, consequently,
there is no limitation upon the plenary power of Congress to regulate
commerce. Of course, the operation of a railroad in interstate commerce
is not an activity that raises the subliminal fears for state sovereignty
that have given rise to the "uniquely governmental" test of taxation
power.
A case that came closer to raising those fears was Maryland v.
Wirtz,61 which upheld application of the minimum wage and hour provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state-operated
schools and hospitals."2 The Court explicitly declared that federal regulatory power under the commerce clause "may override countervailing
state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character." 3 Justice Douglas in dissent decried the "invasion
of state sovereignty" because the FLSA would disrupt the fiscal policy
of the states and threaten their ability to perform services for the public." Justice Douglas thereby expressed the fears described above and
touched on the underlying policies of federalism, which have seldom
found expression in the reported cases.
A Unified Theory of Taxation and Regulatory Immunity
If state sovereignty is to remain a viable proposition, it must find
justification in the ability of states to experiment with new programs,
to tailor government services to local needs, and to provide legislation
designed to deal with local problems. The increasing dominance of the
5145 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6 (1970).
CUnited States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
6392 U.S. 183 (1968).
"Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(r), 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1970).
03392 U.S. at 195.
""It is one thing to force a State to purchase safety equipment for its railroad and another to
force it either to spend several million more dollars on hospitals and schools or substantially reduce
services in these areas." Id. at 203. The language in this quote seems to indicate that Douglas would
distinguish the two situations simply on the basis of the greater cost involved in the latter. Any
distinction to be drawn between the cases probably should depend more on the nature of schools
and hospitals as being more akin to traditional governmental services than operating a railroad.
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federal government forebodes a centralization of government that could
result in programs that are inadequately designed to meet the diverse
needs of all the states. For example, welfare programs such as Aid to
Families with Depedent Children,"5 if operated solely under national
control, might meet the minimum needs of residents in a majority of
states but fall well short of the realities of life in urban centers." Professor Wechsler cites as an example of this phenomenon 7 the rent controls
of the federal government following World War II, which tended to be
less and less effective because most of the country was experiencing a
building boom that held rent prices down. Increasing dissatisfaction by
New Yorkers8 ultimately lead to adoption of a state program that was
much more aggressive and effective in dealing with the crisis faced by
New York residents.6 9
The Supreme Court is on solid ground in finding a distinction
between the taxing power and other delegated powers, such as the commerce power. The taxing power is all-encompassing in subject matter
and is limited explicitly only by specific exclusions and qualifications.7
-42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
6
This is a major reason for the present structure of welfare programs that operate under
national policy guidelines with federal funds matching state funds. The state controls implementation of the programs through its own bureaucracy subject to checks of federal regulations. See,
e.g., Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 470 (9th Cir. 1971).
11H. WECHSLER, PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 53 (1961).
uProfessor Wechsler was personally involved in this and seems to believe that aggressive local
action would have been taken much earlier had it not been for the existence of the federal program.
"'he same point could be made with respect to the minimum wage and hour provisions
validated in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The federal controls might tend to homogenize salary levels throughout the country by stifling attempts to move beyond the federal level,
Should this happen, the results might be somewhat anomalous. For example, the $1.60 hourly
minimum wage will be much more beneficial in Alabama or Mississippi than in Hawaii or Alaska.
On the other hand, it will take considerably more effort for the less wealthy states to raise the
money for these wages. If the result were to curtail activities in the poorer states, then Justice
Douglas' fears would be realized. But if the result were to raise the salary levels and lower the
purchasing price of a dollar in these states, then the resulting uniformity of money prices throughout the states would be beneficial in encouraging more interstate travel and residence mobility.
Thus, it is not at all clear that every policy decision uniformly applied to all states would be
detrimental to the welfare of the federal system.
7
So long as the taxing power is used for revenue purposes, it is subject to only slight limitations. "It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect
taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be
exercised at discretion." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866). The formal requisites on direct taxes caused problems with an income tax, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429 (1895), and led to enactment of the sixteenth amendment.
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The commerce power is not all-encompassing but rather is limited to a
certain segment of human activity. Any activity that comes within the
commerce power may legitimately be referred to as falling outside the
exclusive sphere of the states. If a state activity falls within the delegated
commerce power, then the state is operating in an area in which sovereignty has been transferred to the federal government. The two governments may exercise dual sovereignty over activities within the commerce
power,7" but federal policies within their proper scope are supreme.
State policy must yield when federal policy has been affirmatively
stated.
Because there are differing concepts of immunity in the exercise of
the taxation and commerce powers, one might imagine that the fears
expressed in taxation cases simply are not warranted when the federal
government is regulating activity within one of its expressly delegated
powers. The fear might be greater in face of the unspecified, comprehensive power of taxation and the need to impose limitations on that power
in the interests of greater state sovereignty. The other powers of the
federal government are limited to those which have been specifically
relinquished by the states, who seemingly would have no room for complaint so long as the federal government was acting within its delegated
powers. However, this theoretical distinction ignores some rather important realities. It is the fear of direct regulation of state activities that
is voiced in the taxation cases. The comprehensive nature of the taxation
power has a potential of being used for the purpose of regulating state
governmental activity over which the states have not delegated sovereignty. Thus, the need for limiting the federal commerce power is the
same as the need for limiting the taxation power. In addition, whatever
benefits may be derived from the principles of federalism in the form
71

Chief Justice Marshall established very early the proposition that the states could not enforce

regulations within their own borders that conflicted with existing federal regulations over interstate
commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829), he rejected an argument that laws of Delaware authorizing
dams across navigable creeks were "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant

state ..

" For some years, the Court toyed with the notion that a state regulation might be void

as conflicting with the commerce clause despite congressional silence. See License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504 (1847); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).

Modern doctrine, stemming from Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851),
can be summarized by recognizing dual power of the state and federal governments over subjects
that are local in character but affect interstate commerce. The emphasis in most recent cases has
been on the capacity of state regulations to impede interstate commerce. See Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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of experimentation and decentralization are threatened directly by assertion of any form of federal regulatory power over state governmental
activities. The Supreme Court's wholly conceptual distinction between
taxation and regulation could be said to ignore these goals of the federal
system.
In facing the problems of a federal system directly, one has great
difficulty in specifying the areas of state activity that should be left open
to state autonomy. It would be counter-productive to freeze into constitutional principle a categorization of the particular activities that should
be autonomous and those that should be federally regulated. Many of
the problems that face state and local governments today are occasioned
by historical accident. The territorial boundaries between states bear no
logical relationship to topography or demographic distributions and
probably will remain despite the changes that have taken place over the
last two centuries.72 A similar mistake should not be made by irrevocably allocating areas of responsibility between the state and federal governments. 3 Refusing to make a permanent allocation would be equivalent to recognizing federal power similar to the Supreme Court's determination in Maryland v. Wirtz that the grant of commerce power to
the federal government was plenary and that the states had relinquished
their sovereignty in that area.74
Another objection to placing constitutional limitations on federal
power to regulate state activities stems from a realization that some
states will not meet even minimum standards of governmental action
toward goals that national policy dictates should be pursued. For example, some states might not require a decent living wage, pass equal
72

For a thorough analysis of this and related problems, see ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTI3RGOV(1969).
nln addition to a need for flexibility over a period of time, there is an additional factor.
Whether control of highways or police forces or health services should be regulated by the federal
government involves an assessment of priorities that has been left traditionally to the interplay of
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

the political system. Justice Frankfurter's allusion to this problem was strongly criticized at note
43 supra. Yet the question of what areas the federal government should control may well be the
most classic example of a true political question, having been vested by the Constitution exclusively
in the legislative and executive branches of government. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959). The objection made in note 43 to Justice

Frankfurter's formulation is that it implies an abdication of judicial responsibility that may be
carried over into other fields. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). A better approach would be explicit recognition of
unfettered power in the other branches, which is actually the result of applying the political question
doctrine.
"See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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employment laws, or attempt to deal with housing problems of the poor.
In these fields, the federal government might yield to whatever state
measures have been adopted75 but might initiate a federal program if a
state had failed to act. Imposition of minimum standards by the federal
government would not affront state sovereignty in any meaningful sense

worthy of protection.76 The dangers of over-centralization of govern-

ment always exist in imposing programs on the states but, in situations

requiring the setting of minimum standards, the dangers would be attributable to the unwillingness of the states to set their own houses in

order. It would be ludicrous to suggest that diversity in substandard or
degrading conditions is an ideal to be pursued as a matter of national

constitutional policy.
The foregoing considerations point to a need for diversity and restraint in congressional ordering of programs, but they also demonstrate

the necessity for freedom on the part of Congress in situations in which
the states have shown an unwillingness to provide minimum regulatory

measures. Thus the conceptual result of the Supreme Court's political
rationale also proves to be the better view as a matter of constitutional
principle, in that it leaves Congress free to impose controls on the state
governments 77 within any area of competency that the states have delegated to the federal government." The caveat that Congress should be
"See, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 706(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) to -5(c) (1970),
as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4 (U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 816-17 (Apr. 20, 1972)), providing for EEOC deferral to state equal employment agencies for 180 days after a claim of employment discrimination has been made. See Love
v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
76The power of the federal government to control direct state governmental activities should
come as no surprise to persons who have had recourse to federal assistance in securing fair
elections. Congressional power to protect the right to vote has been explicitly delegated by the
states, and the power may be used to supplant state election agencies with federal examiners when
necessary. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act
of 1965). The power of protecting the right to vote does not extend to altering the definition of an
eligible voter in local elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The disparate opinions
in the latter case make it impossible to synthesize a wide-reaching rule, but the opinions do reflect
a possible increasing sensitivity to local control of local problems.
"The need for flexibility was strongly urged by Hamilton in his defense of the Bank of the
United States, supra note 2: "The expedience of exercising a particular power, at a particular time,
must, indeed, depend on circumstances; but the constitutional right of exercising it must be uniform

and invariable, the same today as tomorrow." 8 THE

PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON

102 (H.

Syrett ed. 1965).
"Hamilton also touched upon this concept: "The only question must be in this, as in every
other case, whether the means to be employed, or, in this instance, the corporation to be erected,
has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged or lawful ends of the government. Thus a

corporation may not be erected by Congress for superintending the police of the city of Philadel-
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sensitive to back off when the states have made a commitment to p;f,

vide these services need hardly be made with any vigor, since Congre, ,
is not likely to continue for long any imposition on the states that is i1 ot
essential.7"

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Court in Marylandv. Wirtz, in rejecting the intergovernmental
immunity argument, expressly reserved for later decision80 the related
question of the enforcement power of the federal government in light
of the eleventh amendment." The question arises when the federal government has created, in admitted exercise of its delegated powers, a
right in individuals and has provided that the right may be enforced by
suit in federal court. 82 The eleventh amendment might be asserted by the
states as an additional form of intergovernmental immunity that stands
as a shield against federal court action. s3
History of the eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity
The eleventh amendment was adopted in 1798 in response to the
immensely unpopular decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,4 which held
phia, because they are not authorized to regulate the police of that city." Id. at 100 (emphasis in
original). Congress may not be authorized explicitly to regulate the police of Philadelphia, but it
is authorized to regulate commerce and to provide protection for civil rights. If the activities of
the Philadelphia Police Department extend into either of these fields of subject matter, then
Congress might use the means of police regulation for the end of achieving its authorized goals.
Under Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), this would raise not a problem of intergovernmental immunity but rather the familiar one of whether the means chosen were rationally related
to legitimate ends. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
79
See Wechsler, supra note 66, at 52-53.
"See note 10 supra.
81See, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890).
"Congress can and often does provide that federal rights may be enforced in state courts. The
state courts are required by the supremacy clause of the Constitution to take jurisdiction over suits
to enforce federal rights so long as the particular court generally has jurisdiction over claims of
this character. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Mondou v. New York, N.Y. & H.R.R.,
223 U.S. 1 (1912). An interesting question not dealt with at length in the present article is whether
the state could successfully assert sovereign immunity in its own courts in response to a suit to
enforce a federal right. See C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 46, at

175 (2d ed. 1970).
'Another facet of intergovernmental immunity beyond the scope of the present article is the
effect of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), and the related doctrines of
comity and abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
"2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).

1973]

INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts extended to suits by
a citizen of one state to collect a debt owed by another state. Chisholm
had been brought under that part of the judicial power that extends to
' s5
"Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State.
It was a diversity case, with no federal question involved, in which
plaintiff sought recovery from the state of Georgia on a note. The states
were heavily in debt after the founding of the United States and it was
feared that opening the federal courts to suits such as Chisholm would
result in collection of these debts. 8 Therefore, the eleventh amendment
was enacted to provide that "[t]he judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.""7
The amendment itself purports to go no further than overruling
Chisholm. On its face it merely indicates that the diversity jurisdiction
over suits between citizens of one state and another state shall be available only when the state is the plaintiff. Debate over its meaning has
centered on whether the amendment restored a common law definition
of judicial power that should have been "construed" to be the meaning
of the Constitution in Chisholm88 or whether the amendment adds a
qualification to what would otherwise have been the proper reading of
the Constitution.89 The use of the phrase "shall not be construed to
extend" indicates that the drafters of the amendment wanted to emphasize that the amendment did not change the law but merely restored the
law as it had been prior to the "incorrect" decision in Chisholm. This
debate is important because it involves the central question whether the
amendment was to provide sovereign immunity for states in the federal
courts or whether it was a mere limitation on the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
Many writers have traced the history of the concept of sovereign
immunity and have found that the doctrine as applied in this country
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The constitutional definition of the federal judicial power over
diversity cases was implemented immediately in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). There was no grant to the federal courts by Congress of federal question jurisdiction until
1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)).
"The background of Chisholm and the eleventh amendment is described in Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). See also Guthrie, supra note 9.
"U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
"See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890) (praising the opinion of Justice Iredell,
who dissented in Chisholm).
"See. e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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did not exist in the common law of England." The courts of England
apparently had always considered the crown to be subject to the law',
because the lawgiver has an obligation not to set differing standards of
conduct for himself and others." As legal philosophers recognize, a legal
obligation cannot exist with respect to any rule that is not applied with
uniformity. 3 Sovereign immunity is primarily a procedural concept
designed to avoid the anomaly that would arise should the king be
required to call himself before his own courts to answer for his wrongs
without his consent. 4 The doctrine also avoided the practical problems
which stemmed from the dependence of the courts upon the king for
enforcement of their decrees. 5 The use of "petitions of right" arose as
the form in which suits were brought against the crown. The petition of
right was originally a request for the consent of the king to suit in his
courts over a particular matter, but the consent was so readily given that
it came to be expected as a matter of right in which the king had no
prerogative to refuse consent.9
Unfortunately, the petition of right was surrounded by a cumber-

some and time-consuming procedure" that limited its effectiveness.
"0E.g., 9 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

1-31 (3d ed. 1944); L.

8

JAFFE,

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 198-213 (1965); Carrow, Sovereign Immunity in
Administrative Law-A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PuB. L. 1, 20 (1960).
"The maxim that "the king can do no wrong" did not mean that the king was always right
but that "[t]he king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong." Ehrlich, Proceedings
Against the Crown (1216-1377), at 42, in 6 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (P.
Vinogradoff ed. 1921).
229 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 90, at 9. A different reason for the same proposition can
also be offered. "The law makes the king, therefore, the king must make a return present to the
law by subjecting himself to its rules." Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 ENG. HIST. REV. 136, 168
(1945).
13L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46.48 (rev. ed. 1969).
"I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1898).
5
This practical difficulty may be a problem in modern times when a court system litigates
suits involving the coordinate executive branch. It should not be a problem, however, when federal
courts litigate claims against the states, because the federal executive can enforce decrees against
state officials. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
"The petition of right had become so firmly established by the middle of the eighteenth century
that Blackstone was able to describe it in these terms:
Whenever . . . it happens, that, by misinformation, or inadvertance, the crown hath
been induced to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie
against the sovereign (for who shall command the king?) yet the law hath furnished the
subject with a decent and respectful mode of removing that invasion, by informing the
king of the true state of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that to know of any
injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it then issues as of course in
the king's own name, his orders to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *255 (emphasis in original).
"The procedure originally called for the chancellor to determine whether a "right" could be
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Ameliorating these limitations, however, was a coordinate practice that
had developed with respect to suits against public officials." The prerog-

ative writs of mandamus"' ° and certiorari'01 could be used to remedy
derelictions of duty on the part of officials, even when the duty to be

performed was payment of funds out of the crown treasury." 2 That a
suit of this nature actually amounted to obtaining damages against the
crown did not deter the courts, who viewed the problem as one merely

of forcing a functionary to perform his legal duties.

3

Perhaps one reason why the courts were not overly concerned with

the nature of these suits was that a protective rule existed with respect
to torts of public servants. Respondeat superior never applied to the

king, and the crown treasury could not be invaded for payment of
damages resulting from the tortious activities of public servants.'04 Only

for disbursement of funds under a legal duty would the writs lie against
crown officers in their official capacity. For torts committed under
authority and in the line of duty, officials would be liable personally

without recourse against the crown.0 5 Under these circumstances, the
suit to reach public monies involved nothing more than enforcement of

the law as it presumably had been promulgated by the king; the courts
were in this sense only assisting the crown in making its officers perform

its commands.
found in the petition, 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 90, at 8, and in modern times calls for sending
the petition through the office of the Home Secretary. Petition of Right Act, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 34
(1860).
"Another slight limitation on this procedure lay in the scope of its subject matter, which did
not include torts committed by the king personally. Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 122 Eng.
Rep. 1191 (Q.B. 1865).
"The notion of private suits against public officers to enforce the king's will was established
very early. See Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. I, c. 24 (1275) (writ of novel disseisin); Statute
of Westminster I I, 13 Edw. 1, c. 13 (1285) (false imprisonment remedy against 8heriffs). A common
law action in case based on denial of the right to vote was approved by the House of Lords in
Ashby v. White, I Brown 62, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703).
100James Bagg's Case, II Co. Rep. 936,77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615);see Jaffe & Henderson,
JudicialReview and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REv. 345, 359 (1956).
'0'Commins v. Massam, March, N.R. 196, 82 Eng. Rep. 473 (K.B. 1643).
"'The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax, 21 Q.B.D. 313 (C.A.
1888). Equity had earlier recognized the remedy of enjoining payments from the treasury to persons
other than the plaintiff. Ellis v. Grey, 6 Sim. 214, 58 Eng. Rep. 574 (Ch. 1833). These cases were
decided after the Constitution was enacted in this country, but various writers have insisted that
the practice was known to English common law at the time of the American Revolution. 2 F.
GoODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 200 (1893); Guthrie, supra note 9, at 194.
'"The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax, 21 Q.B.D. 313, 322
(C.A. 1888).
'"Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Q.B. 1865).
'"Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
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Thus, at the time of the Constitution the common law had established that the sovereign could be called into court only with his consent,
which was expected to be given as a matter of right. On the other hand,
officers of the crown could freely be sued. If the obligation to be enforced were one arising 'from his official capacity, then the courts were
aiding the sovereign. If the obligation to be enforced were his own tort
then the sovereign had no interest in the proceedings. Part of this learning was incorporated into American law in the form of sovereign immunity, but the American system had no sovereign akin to the king to
grant consent to suit in the form of the petition of right.' The concept
of suits against officers is an important one in American constitutional
litigation, but a discussion of it must follow'07 a consideration of the
question whether sovereign immunity ever should have been a part of
federal law at all.
It is arguable that at the time Chisholm v. Georgia was decided,
common law as contained in the Constitution could be interpreted to
provide sovereign immunity for the states. For two reasons, this position
is unlikely. First, the petitions of right had become so firmly established
in English common law that they reflected a judgment that the government should be answerable for its wrongs. In American institutions no
single entity was accepted as the sovereign; instead governments were
created to serve the sovereign people. Under these circumstances sovereign immunity should have no application to suits against the state
governments because they are not truly the sovereign." °8 Secondly, even
if the states were considered as the sovereign in this sense, then they had
relinquished their sovereignty in the powers delegated to the federal
government in the Constitution. One of these grants was the grant of
the judicial power, which included power over suits of any subject matter between a state and a citizen of another state. These factors point
to the conclusion that Chisholm was rightly decided, that citizens of
'See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 238-39 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting). It has been

assumed generally that the legislature is empowered to waive sovereign immunity in American law,
but it could just as easily have been argued that the people and not the legislature were sovereign,

which would lead to the conclusion that state officers could neither claim nor waive sovereign
immunity. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419,479 (Jay, C.J., dissenting): "[T]he people
Justice Wilson made the point even more strongly. Id. at
are the sovereign of this country .
456.

'See notes 123-32 and accompanying text infra.
"'This argument is fraught with difficulties and should not be relied upon with enthusiasm.
First, the history may not be as clear as various students of the time would have us believe. Second,

the conceptualization of sovereignty as resting with the people rather than the states is open to
serious question. Therefore, the argument of delegated sovereignty seems eminently more reliable

to this author.
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another state did have a right to sue a state, and that the eleventh
amendment was a derogation of prior law as it was understood at the
time.
The significance of the conclusion that Chisholm was correct is that
a reading of the eleventh amendment should be confined to its own
language and its apparent purpose of overruling Chisholm. Chief Justice
Marshall developed this proposition at some length in Cohens v.
Virginia,"' which held that the amendment did not prevent appeals by
an individual from state courts to the Supreme Court. Marshall noted
that the amendment still left the state subject to suit by other states:
That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a state from
the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before
the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the
amendment. . . . We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some
other cause than the dignity of a state." '
Marshall found its cause in the debts owed by the states and reasoned
that the amendment was designed to prevent collection of these debts
by the most numerous creditors, namely, citizens of other states.' He
could have gone on to point out that there was no reason for the amendment to forbid suits by citizens of the state itself because there was no
jurisdictional basis in the Constitution for citizens of a state to sue the
state for claims arising out of state law, such as claims on debts owed
2
by the state.1
The question whether the amendment prevented suit by citizens
against their own state finally came before the Court in Hans v.
Louisiana."3 The suit involved bonds issued by the state. Citizens of
Louisiana claimed that their suit to collect interest was cognizable in
federal court on the basis of a federal question. The plaintiffs stated that
the state's disavowal of the debt amounted to an impairment of contract
in violation of the United States Constitution. The Court held that the
eleventh amendment barred suits against the state by citizens of the
same state when the jurisdiction was based on a federal question. The
Court relied on earlier cases which had barred similar suits to collect
1119 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
"'Id. at 406.

""'There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister states would be creditors to any
considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the court in those cases,
because it might be essential to the preservation of peace." Id. at 406-07.
"'See notes 115-16 and accompanying text infra.
113134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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debts in which the same impairment of contract claim had been made
by citizens of other states."'
In all of these debt collection cases, the Court held that the suits
were barred by the eleventh amendment, which had been enacted to
restore the prior law of sovereign immunity that had existed before the
"incorrect" decision in Chisholm. The astounding point about all of
these cases is that their rationale of an eleventh amendment bar to
federal question cases was wholly unnecessary to the result. In none of
these suits was a federal question presented. They all proceeded on the
theory that the state had entered into a contract with the bondholders
and that the state was impairing the obligation of contract by refusing
to pay. The suits were simply efforts to collect debts and the pleadings
of the plaintiffs anticipated the defenses to be raised by the state (statutory provisions cancelling the debts) and asserted that these defenses
were unconstitutional. The federal courts have always refused to allow
the plaintiff to anticipate a defense and base his statement of a federal
claim on that defense."' The claim to debts owed by the state "arises"
as a matter of state law and in no way "arises" under federal law.'
Hans was no different from the earlier debt collection cases in that
it presented no federal question basis of jurisdiction, regardless of the
eleventh amendment. In the cases relied on in Hans, subject matter
jurisdiction would have existed in diversity of the parties as an original
matter had not the eleventh amendment withdrawn this small portion
of diversity jurisdiction from the judicial power of the federal courts.
Thus in these earlier cases the Court was correct in saying that the
eleventh amendment acted as a bar to the suit, but its remarks about
"'The cases relied on by the Court were In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern,
117 U.S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
"'Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,

96 U.S. 199 (1877). Various tests have been stated for determining the presence of a federal
question, beginning with one set forth by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United

States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Referring to the question of the bank's right to sue as a
legal entity, Marshall said, "The question forms an original ingredient in every cause. Whether it
be in fact relied on or not, in the defence, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on." Id.

at 824. Justice Holmes stated that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Justice Cardozo

sought to limit the jurisdiction by a "distinction between controversies that are basic and those
that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possible." Gully

v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 118 (1936). For criticism of the various tests and the difficulty
of applying them, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 17; Chadbourn & Levin, OriginalJurisdiction
of FederalQuestions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639 (1942).

"'The Supreme Court has recognized that these cases did not present proper federal question
jurisdiction. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 187 n.3 (1964).
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the application of the amendment even when a federal question was

stated were pure dicta, for no federal question was properly presented
in the plaintiffs' complaints. Similarly, Hans presented no basis of juris-

diction at all because of the lack of diversity, and all the eleventh amendment rationale was dictum. Not only were these dicta unnecessary to

the case, they were incorrect as a matter of constitutional law."' There
was no sovereign immunity at the time of the Constitution for the
eleventh amendment to reenact. Moreover, the states had relinquished

some sovereignty by delegation of the judicial power to the federal
government. The eleventh amendment was intended to do no more

than to withdraw from the federal judiciary one aspect of the previously delegated power of diversity jurisdiction, namely, power over suits

based on the character of the parties when the plaintiff was a private
118
person and the defendant was a state. If the question is still open,

then the eleventh amendment should no longer be read as a limitation
on the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Suits by individuals to redress constitutionalrights
The states have relinquished their sovereignty by delegating power

to the federal government in two different ways. First, the Constitution
itself creates federally protected individual rights to be shielded from
state infringement. Secondly, Congress is given power to create individ-

ual rights as a matter of federal statutory law. Sovereign immunity of
the states has been considered more often in suits to enforce constitu"'7See text accompanying note 108 supra.

"'No case has come to light in which the Supreme Court has applied an eleventh amendment
bar to a suit clearly arising within the federal question jurisdiction. See note 157 infra. Two
ambiguous tax cases should be noted here. In Great N. Life Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944), suit
was brought against the Insurance Commissioner of Oklahoma to recover taxes paid by a foreign
insurance company. The suit was brought specifically under diversity jurisdiction and relied on the
state statutory provisions for recovery procedures. Nevertheless, the grounds for claiming a refund
were that the tax discriminated against foreign companies, a colorable federal question. The
Supreme Court did not consider the case to be one under the federal question jurisdiction but
simply decided that it was a suit against the state to which the state had not consented.
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), was a substantially identical
suit for recovery of taxes, but the constitutional validity of the state tax had already been settled
in J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). The Court of Appeals divided on the
applicability of a prior state court decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue
of whether the lower court had "decided an important question of local law probably in conflict
with an applicable decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana." 323 U.S. at 462. After argument,
the Court decided that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment without stating whether
the case was one of diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
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tional rights so we may explore these cases before turning to a discussion
of the enforcement of federal statutory rights against the states.
In Cohens v. Virginia"' Justice Marshall attempted to limit the
eleventh amendment to the withdrawal of a small piece of diversity
jurisdiction from the federal judicial power.
A general interest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full power
of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts or of other
claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relations
between the whole and its parts, and so strip the government of the
means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active violation."2

Thus, Marshall seemed to assert that the state could be sued when the
subject matter of the suit fell within the federal question jurisdiction of
the federal courts. He did not rely on this proposition, however, when
presented with the opportunity to do so in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States."' Osborn involved a suit under federal question jurisdiction by
a federal agency against a state official who had acted pursuant to the
charge of the state. Marshall assumed that the state could not have been
made a party to the litigation but avoided the impact of this statement
by refusing to inquire whether the state were not the real party in
interest."2 Marshall stated that so long as full relief could be granted in
the form of an injunction against the agent of the state, 2 1 then jurisdiction over his principal need not be obtained.
The principle of allowing suits against officers of the state harkens
back to English law, which allowed suits against officers to compel their
performance of official duty or to establish personal liability for tortious
wrongs.124 This was followed by the Court in Hans"2 and later in Ex
parte Young, 2 1 which established the proposition that a state officer is
"19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). For a description of the holding in Cohens, see text accompanying note 109 supra.
"19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 407.
2222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
'Id. at 846-59.
Inrhe relief granted in Osborn was an injunction against continuing to withhold money

wrongfully taken from the bank. Marshall delved deeply into common law learning surrounding
the forms of action to determine that the taking was a personal trespass for which the defendant
could be required to respond in damages. On the other hand, equity could duplicate the writ of

replevin, which would have required return of the specific money taken by requiring return of the
fungible notes. Id. at 847-55.

"'See text accompanying notes 100-05 supra.
125134 U.S. at 16.
126209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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stripped of his official capacity when acting unconstitutionally, so that
his action is not state action for purposes of the eleventh amendment.

The obvious distinction between the Osborn rule and the English rule is
that the latter is founded on the notion that the court is simply enforcing
the will of the sovereign against this officer while the Osborn rule results
in a denial of the validity of the commands of the state.127 So long as
the state is deemed to have sovereign immunity, it is difficult to rationalize this interference with the commands of the state by saying that the
suit is not against the state. 28 The reasons for not openly recognizing

that states may be sued to enforce constitutional rights are inadequate,' 29 and the fiction results in unnecessary confusion.'30
1In7his point was recognized and applied in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 489 (1887), one of the
debt collection suits referred to earlier. The Court had earlier held that Virginia must honor its
promise to accept interest coupons on its bonds as payment for taxes. Poindexter v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 270, 292-93 (1885). Ayers was then brought as a bill in equity against state officials to
enjoin them from bringing suits to collect taxes against persons who had offered coupons in
payment. The Court held that Justice Marshall's rule in Osborn must be interpreted as being
inapplicable in any case in which the state would be considered an indispensable party. "The
inference is, that where it is manifest, upon the face of the record, that the defendants have no
individual interest in the controversy, and that the relief sought against them is only in their official
capacity as representatives of the State, which alone is to be affected by the judgment or decree,
the question then arising, whether the suit is not substantially a suit against the State, is one of
jurisdiction." 123 U.S. at 489. Osborn was distinguished on the ground that the officers in that
case would have been liable personally in damages for the wrongs committed and would not have
been able to defend on the basis of the unconstitutional state statute. Id. at 488. Ayers, on the
other hand, involved actions on the part of the defendants that could not have rendered them liable
personally in damages. This distinction seems to have been preserved in Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), although it is difficult to see how Attorney General Young could have been liable in
damages for prosecuting the railroads since malicious prosecution requires a showing of no probable cause for believing that the defendant had committed the offense. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967). Ayers could better be explained on the basis of a general lack of equity jurisdiction
because of a lack of threatened irreparable harm. Guthrie, supra note 9, at 201.
1'Professor Wright characterizes this dilemma in the following terms:
The Fourteenth Amendment runs only to the states; in order to have a right to relief
under the amendment the plaintiff must be able to show that state action is involved in
the denial of his rights. It would have been possible to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment qualified the immunity from suit granted states by the Eleventh Amendment, but
the Court did not so hold. Instead it created the anomaly that enforcement of the
Minnesota statute is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment but merely
the individual wrong of Edward T. Young for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 82, § 48, at 185; see Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending
to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1962).
'"See L. JAFFE, supra note 90, at 221.
'1For example, a change in persons occupying an official position usually requires substitution of the new defendant with an allegation that the successor in office intends to pursue the
policies of his predecessor. Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933). In revising FED. R. Civ. P.
25(d) to provide for automatic substitution of public officers when sued in their official capacity,
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The question whether suit is barred against certain individuals or
political entities for redress of constitutional rights has often been subsumed under the problem whether the defendant is a "person" within
the meaning of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.111 This
section creates a cause of action for deprivation of rights guaranteed by
the federal constitution or laws when the defendant acts "under color"

of law, custom or usage. The Supreme Court has held that a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute,' although a
school board is. 3 These interpretations were based on legislative history3 4 rather than constitutional necessity in the form of sovereign
immunity, 3 but possible problems of sovereign immunity have
strongly influenced the lower courts to interpret the statute to avoid
these problems.

The ability to sue public entities and officials under section 1983
seems to have been influenced in the lower federal courts by the nature
of the suit as well as the nature of the particular entity. Injunctive or
declaratory relief has rarely been denied on the basis of sovereign imthe Advisory Committee sought to avoid "mistaken analogies to the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit or the Eleventh Amendment." Id., Advisory Committee Notes on 1961 Amendment.
Whether this goal will be realized remains to be seen. Cf. Four Star Publications, Inc. v. Erbe,
304 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1962).
Further problems are generated by the question whether particular individuals or entities are
subject to certain types of suits. See notes 135-144 and accompanying text infra.
13142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizens of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
13 2Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1"Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
13lThe legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act contained a provision for strict liability
against a municipality in which a deprivation of civil rights occurred. The purpose of the provision
was to provide a readily available and solvent defendant against whom the in terrorenm effect of
liability could be wielded to force municipal officers to protect the rights of their residents. The
provision was finally deleted as being too powerful a club, but no indication was given that
municipalities should not be liable for the authorized acts of their agents. The Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), reading of the legislative history has been vigorously and convincingly criticized in Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 131 (1972).
135lt has long been established that the eleventh amendment does not stand as a bar to suits
in federal court against counties and cities whether under diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
118 (1868); see Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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munity, 35 while damages have been difficult to obtain against a public

entity.'37 Some courts have read section 1983 as precluding suit against

a municipality or public entity only when damages are sought and not

when equitable relief is possible.13 This choice obviously reflects an
unwillingness to invade state treasuries even under circumstances that
would have allowed an invasion at common law when the court was

simply enforcing the will of the sovereign against an official.,

Other

courts have pursued the inquiry whether a suit is "actually against the
state" to determine whether the entity is a person within the meaning
of section 1983.1 0 This inquiry also touches on the sovereign immunity
problem' created by the dicta of Hans and In re Ayers that the state
is immune from federal question suits and that a suit should be dis-

missed if the state is an indispensable party.'
'See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Holt v.
Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966); Willie v.
Harris County, 202 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
'"37See McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Kates & Kouba, supra
note 136, at 140-44; Note, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45
TEXAs

L.

REV.

1015 (1968).

'"See Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961): "None of the reasons
which support a city's immunity from an action for damages for tortious injuries already inflicted
by its officers, agents or servants applies to this case. No reason is apparent why a city and its
officials should not be restrained from prospectively violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to its own legislative enactment, and an injunction not be granted as provided in § 1983."
The Supreme Court could be seen as having approved this distinction. Compare Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam),
with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
"'The Supreme Court, however, has not been deterred from granting relief against an individual officer even when doing so would result in payment of large sums of money out of the state
treasury. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a one-year
residency requirement for welfare recipients). Although no eleventh amendment argument was
made to the Court, it might be questioned whether Shapiro does not effectively overrule Ayers
sub silentio. The result in Shapiro is equivalent to a money judgment in damages against the state
because the defendant officer is directed to pay over state funds, not his own. In Ayers a similar
result was condemned by distinguishing Osborn on the ground that the state officials in Ayers
would not have been liable in damages for individual trespass actions. The same can be said of the
welfare administrators in Shapiro. Thus it is open to question whether the Supreme Court still
follows the rule of looking beyond the pleadings to determine whether a suit is actually against
the state. See note 121 supra.
"'See, e.g., Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1969); Taylor v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 263 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
"'Some courts make the inquiry explicitly in terms of the eleventh amendment despite the
admonitions of the Supreme Court. For a sampling of these cases, see C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS AcTs 64 (1971); Note, Civil Rights-Immunity of Municipalities and Municipal Officials-Action of Municipal Housing Authority and Its DirectorHeld Not Enjoinable Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 225 (1968).
"'See note 129 supra.
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Section 1983 is a hybrid action authorizing enforcement of both
constitutional rights and rights created by Congress. It has never been
necessary to determine whether specific provisions of the Constitution
itself create implied private rights of action against the states or state
officers, although it is likely that the fourteenth amendment would be
so read should the question ever arise.1 3 If the Constitution creates
individual rights with an implied private action to enforce those rights,
then it is difficult to see how the states or state officers could claim to
have retained sovereign immunity against suits of this nature. It has
been unnecessary to decide this question because the fourteenth amendment explicitly gave Congress the power to enforce its provisions by
legislation'44 and Congress immediately did so by enacting section
1983.145
Under section 1983 it is even more difficult for the states to claim
sovereign immunity. The grant of power to Congress in the fourteenth
amendment is a direct relinquishment of sovereignty in the field of
constitutional rights. Under Maryland v. Wirtz 4' the states would be
subject to regulation of Congress at least so long as that regulation did
not reach conduct that could not validly be regulated when engaged in
by private persons. 14 7 This raises some slight conceptual difficulty with
section 1983 actions because it is only under color of state law, custom,
or usage that a person can violate constitutional restrictions, and it
might be thought that section 1983 actions do reach conduct that could
not be reached if engaged in by private persons. The degree of state
action required to establish liability against a private person, however,
is slight and a private person might be held liable because of acting
under the color of state law even though his action were illegal under
state law. 4 ' The state need not put its stamp of approval on the actions
of a defendant before he may be held to answer for the constitutional
wrong.' If the state does approve and authorize the actions of a private
13rlhe question could not have arisen prior to 1875 because there was no general federal

question jurisdiction grant to the federal trial courts such as now appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970). After years of doubt under Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Supreme Court has

finally decided that there is an implied private right of action against federal officers arising from
the Constitution itself. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
.. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
'Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
'4392 U.S. 183 (1968).
'"Id. at 196.
1'Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
'Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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person or public official, then liability imposed on the state would not
discriminate against the state and should be held to be within the delegated enforcement power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment. ' 0
Suits to enforce federal statutory rights
The Supreme Court apparently has recognized a difference between cases brought to vindicate constitutional liberties and cases
brought to enforce claims created by Congress. In Parden v. Terminal
Railway,"' suit was brought against a state-owned and -operated railroad for damages for personal injuries sustained by employees covered
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 5 2 The Court referred to Hans
and the other debt collection cases 5 ' and stated that "for the first time
in this Court, a State's claim of immunity against suit by an individual
meets a suit brought upon a cause of action expressly created by Con- The Court might have been expected to hold that the state had
gress.' 54
no immunity when Congress was acting within its delegated power to
regulate commerce. 5 5 Certain language in Parden shows that the Court
considered this theory:
By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand
in the way of such regulation. Since imposition of the FELA right of
action upon interstate railroads is within the congressional regulatory
power, it must follow that application of the Act to such a railroad
cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity."'
'Congress, of course, has not chosen to exercise its power so broadly in section 1983, which

is limited to suits against "persons." If is argued here that Congress could have sanctioned suits
against the states, that these suits may be implicitly authorized by the eleventh amendment (see
note 143 supra), and that considerations of sovereign immunity should play no part in determining
who or what is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.
151377 U.S. 184 (1964).
15245 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
"3'The Court quoted Hans for the proposition that "Nor is the State divested of its immunity
'on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.'" 377 U.S. at 186. The Court also cited for the same proposition Exparte New York, 256
U.S. 490 (1921); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Smith v.Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
See note 157 infra.
"'377 U.S. at 187.
"'Of the debt collection cases and the others cited note 153 supra, the Court said that they
"were also commonplace suits in which the federal question did not itself give rise to the alleged
cause of action against the State but merely lurked in the background." 377 U.S. at 187 n.3. See
notes 115-121 and accompanying text supra.
116377 U.S. at 192.
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The Court, however, failed to reach so broadly in Parden. Rather
than relying solely on an abandonment of state sovereignty in the field
of interstate commerce, the Court also found a waiver of sovereign
immunity from suit based on the state's operation of a railroad in
interstate commerce following enactment of federal statutes regulating
railroads in interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that Congress had
"conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon
amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to
have accepted that condition and thus to have consented to suit."', 7
The waiver rationale of Parden is particularly disturbing because
of the Court's reliance on what appears to be a governmentalproprietary distinction.
[Wlhen a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters
into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to
that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation. .

.

.States have entered and are entering numerous forms of

activity which, if carried on by a private person or corporation, would
be subject to federal regulation.'

This language leaves open the possibility that the state could argue for
immunity from private suit when it has done nothing affirmative to step
outside its traditional role as a government. Just as the taxation cases
seem to recognize an immunity for those functions that are "uniquely
governmental," Parden seems to leave an umbrella of immunity for
those state activities that would not be subject to a finding of waiver. It
has been argued above'59 and is submitted here that the taxation cases
present a situation completely different from the abandonment of sovereignty in fields within congressional power, and that the sovereign immunity doctrine should have no application to rights arising under federal laws that are validly enacted within congressional spheres of power.
The waiver rationale of Parden can also be attacked on another
basis. If the eleventh amendment is read as having adopted a doctrine
of sovereign immunity rather than as having withdrawn a portion of
diversity jurisdiction, then its limitation of the judicial power of the
United States would not be subject to waiver. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is strictly limited by the Constitution'
1Id.

1111d. at 196-97.
"Notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
"'Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
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and cannot be waived,' asserted by estoppel,' or created by consent
of the parties.' If the judicial power does not extend to private suits
against the states, then nothing that the states do could create subject
matter jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court has often recognized
waivers of sovereign immunity,'64 the eleventh amendment should be
considered a jurisdictional provision, not an enactment of the principles
of sovereign immunity.
If the waiver rationale of Parden were disavowed, then the Court
would be free to base its reading of all previous cases upon a reinvestigation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The erroneous dicta of the
debt collection cases could be disregarded and the states held to have
relinquished their sovereignty within those areas delegated to the federal
government. State immunity from suit could be seen as never having
existed, and the eleventh amendment could be read as it was probably
intended, as a limitation upon the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. One limitation that might need to be implied from the nature of
the federal system would be the type of limitation mentioned in both
the taxation and regulatory cases-a limitation on congressional power
rather than upon the jurisdiction of the courts. This is the limitation that
Congress cannot discriminate against the states with an intent to put
them at a disadvantage. Thus a regulation that operated only on states
because of their state function would be viewed in a different light as a
matter of federal power, but this would have no impact on the federal
question jurisdiction of the courts.
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to make this reinvestigation of the immunity doctrines this term when it decides a question that
has split the circuits.'6 5 This is the question that was expressly reserved
in Maryland v. Wirtz-whether the eleventh amendment prohibits suits
for private enforcement of the rights created by the Fair Labor Stan"'Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393

(1857).
'E.g., Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
lnE.g., People's Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260 (1880); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 148 (1834).

"'In Parden, the Court cited numerous cases for the proposition that the state may consent
to suit. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Gunter v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
'"'See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972) (No. 71-1021) (no waiver); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (waiver found).
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dards Act. 6 ' The Act provides for coverage of state-operated schools

and hospitals, activities that are less susceptible of being construed as a
waiver than operation of a railroad. The proper mode of decision as
outlined here would be that the states have no sovereign immunity in
federal question jurisdiction and that Maryland v. Wirtz has settled that
their abandonment of sovereignty has made them subject to congressional regulation of these activities within the commerce power.
This decision will have great impact on recent and proposed legislation. For example, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,17
which provides for fair employment opportunities, was extended to
cover state employment, suits both by the Attorney General of the
United States and private individuals were authorized against private
employers. 6 There is little question but that the enforcement powers of
the Attorney General will be upheld'69 under Maryland v. Wirtz, but it
will be more difficult to uphold private enforcement. 7 ° Under Parden's
waiver rationale, it would be difficult to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity by a state in the act of employing public agents. A better

result would be reached by allowing private suits under federal question
jurisdiction in those areas in which the states have abandoned their
sovereignty to Congress.' Hopefully, the Court will so rule.
16392 U.S. at 200.
16742 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
'"Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(1)(1) (U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 817-18 (Apr. 20, 1972)). The Attorney General is given original opportunity
to sue but a private person may bring suit if no action is filed by the Attorney General.
"'Some argument will presumably be made on the basis of the relief sought, which will inure
to the benefit of individual employees. It could be argued that the suit is actually brought by the
Attorney General to enforce a right belonging to an individual, who would be barred from suing
the state by the eleventh amendment. Reliance could be placed on Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 258 n.12 (1972); "In order to properly invoke [original Supreme Court] jurisdiction,
the State must bring an action on its own behalf and not on behalf of particular citizens ....
An action brought by one State against another violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff
State is actually suing to recover for injuries to designated individuals."
An argument similar to this has been rejected when the Secretary of Labor has sued to enjoin
violations of the wage and hour provisions considered in Maryland v. Wirtz. Hodgson v. Board of
Educ., 344 F. Supp. 79 (D.N.J. 1972).
'"'The 1972 amendments do allow the private complainant to intervene if an action is brought
by the Attorney General against a governmental employer. Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 818 (Apr. 20, 1972)). This
provision could raise an eleventh amendment problem when intervention is sought.
' T See also Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970), which authorizes suits
against government instrumentalities "to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution."

